[LTP] [PATCH 2/2] bpf: Check truncation on 32bit div/mod by zero
Richard Palethorpe
rpalethorpe@suse.com
Mon Apr 26 14:01:07 CEST 2021
Add a test which checks for a number of issues surrounding division by
zero.
Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <rpalethorpe@suse.com>
---
Possibly instead we should generate a series of BPF programs which try
to do something bad for each possible verifier-runtime mismatch. I'm
not sure this would actually reduce false positives however, due to
the increase in complexity of the test.
runtest/cve | 1 +
runtest/syscalls | 1 +
testcases/kernel/syscalls/bpf/.gitignore | 1 +
testcases/kernel/syscalls/bpf/bpf_prog05.c | 235 +++++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 238 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 testcases/kernel/syscalls/bpf/bpf_prog05.c
diff --git a/runtest/cve b/runtest/cve
index f650854f9..3beb88bb0 100644
--- a/runtest/cve
+++ b/runtest/cve
@@ -61,3 +61,4 @@ cve-2020-11494 pty04
cve-2020-14386 sendto03
cve-2020-14416 pty03
cve-2020-29373 io_uring02
+cve-2021-3444 bpf_prog05
diff --git a/runtest/syscalls b/runtest/syscalls
index 546a988c2..60c0a7a99 100644
--- a/runtest/syscalls
+++ b/runtest/syscalls
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ bpf_prog01 bpf_prog01
bpf_prog02 bpf_prog02
bpf_prog03 bpf_prog03
bpf_prog04 bpf_prog04
+bpf_prog05 bpf_prog05
brk01 brk01
brk02 brk02
diff --git a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/bpf/.gitignore b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/bpf/.gitignore
index 74742c0cd..42365cef5 100644
--- a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/bpf/.gitignore
+++ b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/bpf/.gitignore
@@ -3,3 +3,4 @@ bpf_prog01
bpf_prog02
bpf_prog03
bpf_prog04
+bpf_prog05
diff --git a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/bpf/bpf_prog05.c b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/bpf/bpf_prog05.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..48270f4ca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/bpf/bpf_prog05.c
@@ -0,0 +1,235 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2021 SUSE LLC <rpalethorpe@suse.com>
+ */
+
+/*\
+ * [Description]
+ *
+ * Compare the effects of 32-bit div/mod by zero with the "expected"
+ * behaviour.
+ *
+ * The commit "bpf: fix subprog verifier bypass by div/mod by 0
+ * exception", changed div/mod by zero from exiting the current
+ * program to setting the destination register to zero (div) or
+ * leaving it untouched (mod).
+ *
+ * This solved one verfier bug which allowed dodgy pointer values, but
+ * it turned out that the source register was being 32-bit truncated
+ * when it should not be. Also the destination register for mod was
+ * not being truncated when it should be.
+ *
+ * So then we have the following two fixes:
+ * "bpf: Fix 32 bit src register truncation on div/mod"
+ * "bpf: Fix truncation handling for mod32 dst reg wrt zero"
+ *
+ * Testing for all of these issues is a problem. Not least because
+ * division by zero is undefined, so in theory any result is
+ * acceptable so long as the verifier and runtime behaviour
+ * match.
+ *
+ * However to keep things simple we just check if the source and
+ * destination register runtime values match the current upstream
+ * behaviour at the time of writing.
+ *
+ * If the test fails you may have one or more of the above patches
+ * missing. In this case it is possible that you are not vulnerable
+ * depending on what other backports and fixes have been applied. If
+ * upstream changes the behaviour of division by zero, then the test
+ * will need updating.
+\*/
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <inttypes.h>
+
+#include "config.h"
+#include "tst_test.h"
+#include "tst_taint.h"
+#include "tst_capability.h"
+#include "lapi/socket.h"
+#include "lapi/bpf.h"
+#include "bpf_common.h"
+
+#define BUFSIZE 8192
+
+static const char MSG[] = "Ahoj!";
+static char *msg;
+
+static uint32_t *key;
+static uint64_t *val;
+static char *log;
+static union bpf_attr *attr;
+
+static int load_prog(int fd)
+{
+ struct bpf_insn insn[] = {
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_6, 1), /* r6 = 1 */
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_LSH, BPF_REG_6, 32), /* r6 <<= 32 */
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_7, -1LL), /* r7 = -1 */
+ BPF_ALU32_REG(BPF_DIV, BPF_REG_7, BPF_REG_6), /* w7 /= w6 */
+
+ BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, fd),
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), /* r2 = fp */
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -4), /* r2 = r2 - 4 */
+ BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_2, 0, 0), /* *r2 = 0 */
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_6, 0),
+
+ BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, fd),
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -4),
+ BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_2, 0, 1), /* *r2 = 1 */
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_7, 0),
+
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_6, 1),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_LSH, BPF_REG_6, 32),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_7, -1LL),
+ BPF_ALU32_REG(BPF_MOD, BPF_REG_7, BPF_REG_6), /* w7 %= w6 */
+
+ BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, fd),
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -4),
+ BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_2, 0, 2), /* *r2 = 2 */
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_6, 0),
+
+ BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, fd),
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -4),
+ BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_2, 0, 3), /* *r2 = 3 */
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_7, 0),
+
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN()
+ };
+
+ bpf_init_prog_attr(attr, insn, sizeof(insn), log, BUFSIZE);
+
+ return bpf_load_prog(attr, log);
+}
+
+static void setup(void)
+{
+ rlimit_bump_memlock();
+ memcpy(msg, MSG, sizeof(MSG));
+}
+
+static void run(void)
+{
+ int map_fd, prog_fd;
+ int sk[2];
+
+ memset(attr, 0, sizeof(*attr));
+ attr->map_type = BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY;
+ attr->key_size = 4;
+ attr->value_size = 8;
+ attr->max_entries = 4;
+
+ map_fd = bpf_map_create(attr);
+ prog_fd = load_prog(map_fd);
+
+ SAFE_SOCKETPAIR(AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM, 0, sk);
+ SAFE_SETSOCKOPT(sk[1], SOL_SOCKET, SO_ATTACH_BPF, &prog_fd,
+ sizeof(prog_fd));
+
+ SAFE_WRITE(1, sk[0], msg, sizeof(MSG));
+ SAFE_CLOSE(sk[0]);
+ SAFE_CLOSE(sk[1]);
+ SAFE_CLOSE(prog_fd);
+
+ tst_res(TINFO, "Check w7(-1) /= w6(0) [r7 = -1, r6 = 1 << 32]");
+ memset(attr, 0, sizeof(*attr));
+ attr->map_fd = map_fd;
+ attr->key = ptr_to_u64(key);
+ attr->value = ptr_to_u64(val);
+ *key = 0;
+ TST_EXP_PASS_SILENT(bpf(BPF_MAP_LOOKUP_ELEM, attr, sizeof(*attr)));
+ if (TST_RET)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (*val != 1UL << 32) {
+ tst_res(TFAIL,
+ "src(r6) = %"PRIu64", but should be %"PRIu64,
+ *val, 1UL << 32);
+ } else {
+ tst_res(TPASS, "src(r6) = %"PRIu64, *val);
+ }
+
+ *key = 1;
+ TST_EXP_PASS_SILENT(bpf(BPF_MAP_LOOKUP_ELEM, attr, sizeof(*attr)));
+ if (TST_RET)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (*val)
+ tst_res(TFAIL, "dst(r7) = %"PRIu64", but should be zero", *val);
+
+ tst_res(TPASS, "dst(r7) = %"PRIu64, *val);
+
+ tst_res(TINFO, "Check w7(-1) %%= w6(0) [r7 = -1, r6 = 1 << 32]");
+ *key = 2;
+ TST_EXP_PASS_SILENT(bpf(BPF_MAP_LOOKUP_ELEM, attr, sizeof(*attr)));
+ if (TST_RET)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (*val != 1UL << 32) {
+ tst_res(TFAIL,
+ "src(r6) = %"PRIu64", but should be %"PRIu64,
+ *val, 1UL << 32);
+ } else {
+ tst_res(TPASS, "src(r6) = %"PRIu64, *val);
+ }
+
+ *key = 3;
+ TST_EXP_PASS_SILENT(bpf(BPF_MAP_LOOKUP_ELEM, attr, sizeof(*attr)));
+ if (TST_RET)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (*val != (uint32_t)-1) {
+ tst_res(TFAIL,
+ "dst(r7) = %"PRIu64", but should be %"PRIu32,
+ *val, (uint32_t)-1);
+ } else {
+ tst_res(TPASS, "dst(r7) = %"PRIu64, *val);
+ }
+
+out:
+ SAFE_CLOSE(map_fd);
+}
+
+static struct tst_test test = {
+ .setup = setup,
+ .test_all = run,
+ .min_kver = "3.18",
+ .taint_check = TST_TAINT_W | TST_TAINT_D,
+ .caps = (struct tst_cap []) {
+ TST_CAP(TST_CAP_DROP, CAP_SYS_ADMIN),
+ {}
+ },
+ .bufs = (struct tst_buffers []) {
+ {&key, .size = sizeof(*key)},
+ {&val, .size = sizeof(*val)},
+ {&log, .size = BUFSIZE},
+ {&attr, .size = sizeof(*attr)},
+ {&msg, .size = sizeof(MSG)},
+ {}
+ },
+ .tags = (const struct tst_tag[]) {
+ {"linux-git", "f6b1b3bf0d5f"},
+ {"linux-git", "468f6eafa6c4"},
+ {"linux-git", "e88b2c6e5a4d"},
+ {"linux-git", "9b00f1b78809"},
+ {"CVE", "CVE-2021-3444"},
+ {}
+ }
+};
--
2.31.1
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