[LTP] [PATCH v2] syscalls/prctl06.c: New test for prctl() with PR_{SET, GET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS
Yang Xu
xuyang2018.jy@cn.fujitsu.com
Wed Jun 19 12:58:40 CEST 2019
Signed-off-by: Yang Xu <xuyang2018.jy@cn.fujitsu.com>
---
include/lapi/prctl.h | 5 +
runtest/syscalls | 1 +
testcases/kernel/syscalls/prctl/.gitignore | 1 +
testcases/kernel/syscalls/prctl/prctl06.c | 173 ++++++++++++++++++
.../kernel/syscalls/prctl/prctl06_execve.c | 65 +++++++
5 files changed, 245 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 testcases/kernel/syscalls/prctl/prctl06.c
create mode 100644 testcases/kernel/syscalls/prctl/prctl06_execve.c
diff --git a/include/lapi/prctl.h b/include/lapi/prctl.h
index ad0b12bce..54b3da20f 100644
--- a/include/lapi/prctl.h
+++ b/include/lapi/prctl.h
@@ -24,4 +24,9 @@
# define PR_GET_CHILD_SUBREAPER 37
#endif
+#ifndef PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS
+# define PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS 38
+# define PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS 39
+#endif
+
#endif /* LAPI_PRCTL_H__ */
diff --git a/runtest/syscalls b/runtest/syscalls
index 702d6a8c7..a9cad6748 100644
--- a/runtest/syscalls
+++ b/runtest/syscalls
@@ -860,6 +860,7 @@ prctl02 prctl02
prctl03 prctl03
prctl04 prctl04
prctl05 prctl05
+prctl06 prctl06
pread01 pread01
pread01_64 pread01_64
diff --git a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/prctl/.gitignore b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/prctl/.gitignore
index 9ecaf9854..f52f6f665 100644
--- a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/prctl/.gitignore
+++ b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/prctl/.gitignore
@@ -3,3 +3,4 @@
/prctl03
/prctl04
/prctl05
+/prctl06
diff --git a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/prctl/prctl06.c b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/prctl/prctl06.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9dd82a241
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/prctl/prctl06.c
@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 FUJITSU LIMITED. All rights reserved.
+ * Author: Yang Xu <xuyang2018.jy@cn.fujitsu.com>
+ *
+ * Test PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS and PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS of prctl(2).
+ *
+ * 1)Return the value of the no_new_privs bit for the calling thread.
+ * A value of 0 indicates the regular execve(2) behavior. A value of
+ * 1 indicates execve(2) will operate in the privilege-restricting mode.
+ * 2)With no_new_privs set to 1, diables privilege granting operations
+ * at execve-time. For example, a process will not be able to execute a
+ * setuid binary to change their uid or gid if this bit is set. The same
+ * is true for file capabilities.
+ * 3)The setting of this bit is inherited by children created by fork(2).
+ * We also check NoNewPrivs field in /proc/[pid]/status if it supports.
+ */
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <sys/prctl.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/capability.h>
+#include <lapi/prctl.h>
+#include "tst_test.h"
+
+#define IPC_ENV_VAR "LTP_IPC_PATH"
+#define MNTPOINT "mntpoint"
+#define TESTBIN "prctl06_execve"
+#define TEST_REL_BIN_DIR MNTPOINT"/"
+#define SUID_MODE (S_ISUID|S_ISGID|S_IXUSR|S_IXGRP|S_IXOTH)
+
+static int flag = 1;
+static char CapEff[20];
+
+static void check_proc_field(int val, char *name)
+{
+ char path[50];
+ pid_t pid;
+ int field = 0;
+
+ pid = getpid();
+ sprintf(path, "/proc/%d/status", pid);
+
+ TEST(FILE_LINES_SCANF(path, "NoNewPrivs:%d", &field));
+ if (TST_RET == 1) {
+ tst_res(TCONF,
+ "/proc/[pid]/status doesn't support NoNewPrivs field");
+ flag = 0;
+ return;
+ }
+ if (val == field)
+ tst_res(TPASS, "%s %s NoNewPrivs field expected %d got %d",
+ name, path, val, field);
+ else
+ tst_res(TFAIL, "%s %s NoNewPrivs field expected %d got %d",
+ name, path, val, field);
+
+ SAFE_FILE_LINES_SCANF(path, "CapEff:%s", CapEff);
+}
+
+static void check_no_new_privs(int val, char *name)
+{
+ TEST(prctl(PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 0, 0, 0, 0));
+ if (TST_RET == val)
+ tst_res(TPASS,
+ "%s prctl(PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS) expected %d got %d",
+ name, val, val);
+ else
+ tst_res(TFAIL,
+ "%s prctl(PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS) expected %d got %ld",
+ name, val, TST_RET);
+ if (flag)
+ check_proc_field(val, name);
+}
+
+static void do_prctl(void)
+{
+ char ipc_env_var[1024];
+ char *const argv[] = {"prctl06_execve", "parent process", CapEff, NULL};
+ char *const childargv[] = {"prctl06_execve", "child process", CapEff, NULL};
+ char *const envp[] = {"LTP_TEST_ENV_VAR=test", ipc_env_var, NULL };
+ int childpid;
+ struct passwd *pw;
+ uid_t nobody_uid;
+ gid_t nobody_gid;
+
+ pw = SAFE_GETPWNAM("nobody");
+ nobody_uid = pw->pw_uid;
+ nobody_gid = pw->pw_gid;
+
+ check_no_new_privs(0, "parent");
+ tst_res(TINFO,
+ "parent process CapEff %s when no new privs was 0", CapEff);
+
+ TEST(prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0));
+ if (TST_RET == -1) {
+ tst_res(TFAIL | TTERRNO, "prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS) failed");
+ return;
+ }
+ tst_res(TPASS, "prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS) succeeded");
+
+ SAFE_CHMOD("prctl06_execve", SUID_MODE);
+ SAFE_SETGID(nobody_gid);
+ SAFE_SETUID(nobody_uid);
+
+ sprintf(ipc_env_var, IPC_ENV_VAR "=%s", getenv(IPC_ENV_VAR));
+
+ childpid = SAFE_FORK();
+ if (childpid == 0) {
+ check_no_new_privs(1, "child");
+ execve("prctl06_execve", childargv, envp);
+ tst_brk(TFAIL | TTERRNO,
+ "child process failed to execute prctl_execve");
+
+ } else {
+ tst_reap_children();
+ check_no_new_privs(1, "parent");
+ tst_res(TINFO,
+ "parent process CapEff %s when no new privs was 1", CapEff);
+ execve("prctl06_execve", argv, envp);
+ tst_brk(TFAIL | TTERRNO,
+ "parent process failed to execute prctl_execve");
+ }
+}
+
+static void verify_prctl(void)
+{
+ int pid;
+
+ pid = SAFE_FORK();
+ if (pid == 0) {
+ do_prctl();
+ exit(0);
+ }
+ tst_reap_children();
+}
+
+static void setup(void)
+{
+ TEST(prctl(PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 0, 0, 0, 0));
+ if (TST_RET == 0) {
+ tst_res(TINFO, "kernel supports PR_GET/SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS");
+ SAFE_CP(TESTBIN, TEST_REL_BIN_DIR);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (TST_ERR == EINVAL)
+ tst_brk(TCONF,
+ "kernel doesn't support PR_GET/SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS");
+
+ tst_brk(TBROK | TTERRNO,
+ "current environment doesn't permit PR_GET/SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS");
+}
+
+static const char *const resfile[] = {
+ TESTBIN,
+ NULL,
+};
+
+static struct tst_test test = {
+ .resource_files = resfile,
+ .setup = setup,
+ .test_all = verify_prctl,
+ .forks_child = 1,
+ .needs_root = 1,
+ .mount_device = 1,
+ .mntpoint = MNTPOINT,
+ .child_needs_reinit = 1,
+};
diff --git a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/prctl/prctl06_execve.c b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/prctl/prctl06_execve.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6b256afae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/prctl/prctl06_execve.c
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 FUJITSU LIMITED. All rights reserved.
+ * Author: Yang Xu <xuyang2018.jy@cn.fujitsu.com>
+ *
+ * dummy program which is used by prctl06 testcase
+ */
+#define TST_NO_DEFAULT_MAIN
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include "tst_test.h"
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ struct passwd *pw;
+ uid_t unknown_uid;
+ gid_t unknown_gid;
+ char path[50];
+ char CapEff[20];
+ pid_t pid;
+
+ tst_reinit();
+ if (argc != 3)
+ tst_brk(TFAIL, "argc is %d, expected 3", argc);
+
+ pid = getpid();
+ sprintf(path, "/proc/%d/status", pid);
+ SAFE_FILE_LINES_SCANF(path, "CapEff:%s", CapEff);
+
+ if (strncmp(CapEff, argv[2], sizeof(CapEff)))
+ tst_res(TFAIL,
+ "%s gains root privileges, current CapEff %s, expect %s",
+ argv[1], CapEff, argv[2]);
+ else
+ tst_res(TPASS,
+ "%s doesn't gain root privileges, CapEff %s",
+ argv[1], CapEff);
+
+ pw = SAFE_GETPWNAM("nobody");
+ unknown_uid = pw->pw_uid + 1;
+ unknown_gid = pw->pw_gid + 1;
+
+ TEST(setgid(unknown_gid));
+ if (TST_RET == -1)
+ tst_res(TPASS,
+ "%s setgid(%d) isn't permmit", argv[1], unknown_gid);
+ else
+ tst_res(TFAIL, "%s setgid(%d) succeed expectedly",
+ argv[1], unknown_gid);
+
+ TEST(setuid(unknown_uid));
+ if (TST_RET == -1)
+ tst_res(TPASS,
+ "%s setuid(%d) isn't permmit", argv[1], unknown_uid);
+ else
+ tst_res(TFAIL, " %s setuid(%d) succeed unexpectedly",
+ argv[1], unknown_gid);
+
+ return 0;
+}
--
2.18.1
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