[LTP] [PATCH v2 3/8] Rewrite userns03.c using new LTP API
Andrea Cervesato
andrea.cervesato@suse.de
Tue Mar 15 13:23:46 CET 2022
Signed-off-by: Andrea Cervesato <andrea.cervesato@suse.de>
---
testcases/kernel/containers/userns/userns03.c | 266 ++++++++----------
1 file changed, 121 insertions(+), 145 deletions(-)
diff --git a/testcases/kernel/containers/userns/userns03.c b/testcases/kernel/containers/userns/userns03.c
index be511fec8..1084bef72 100644
--- a/testcases/kernel/containers/userns/userns03.c
+++ b/testcases/kernel/containers/userns/userns03.c
@@ -1,19 +1,14 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
/*
* Copyright (c) Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd., 2015
- * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
- * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the Free
- * Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your option)
- * any later version. This program is distributed in the hope that it will be
- * useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
- * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General
- * Public License for more details. You should have received a copy of the GNU
- * General Public License along with this program.
+ * Copyright (C) 2022 SUSE LLC Andrea Cervesato <andrea.cervesato@suse.com>
*/
-/*
- * Verify that:
- * /proc/PID/uid_map and /proc/PID/gid_map contains three values separated by
- * white space:
+/*\
+ * [Description]
+ *
+ * Verify that /proc/PID/uid_map and /proc/PID/gid_map contains three values
+ * separated by white space:
* ID-inside-ns ID-outside-ns length
*
* ID-outside-ns is interpreted according to which process is opening the file.
@@ -26,29 +21,23 @@
* The string "deny" would be written to /proc/self/setgroups before GID
* check if setgroups is allowed, see kernel commits:
*
- * commit 9cc46516ddf497ea16e8d7cb986ae03a0f6b92f8
- * Author: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
- * Date: Tue Dec 2 12:27:26 2014 -0600
- * userns: Add a knob to disable setgroups on a per user namespace basis
- *
- * commit 66d2f338ee4c449396b6f99f5e75cd18eb6df272
- * Author: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
- * Date: Fri Dec 5 19:36:04 2014 -0600
- * userns: Allow setting gid_maps without privilege when setgroups is disabled
+ * commit 9cc46516ddf497ea16e8d7cb986ae03a0f6b92f8
+ * Author: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
+ * Date: Tue Dec 2 12:27:26 2014 -0600
+ * userns: Add a knob to disable setgroups on a per user namespace basis
*
+ * commit 66d2f338ee4c449396b6f99f5e75cd18eb6df272
+ * Author: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
+ * Date: Fri Dec 5 19:36:04 2014 -0600
+ * userns: Allow setting gid_maps without privilege when setgroups is disabled
*/
#define _GNU_SOURCE
-#include <sys/wait.h>
-#include <assert.h>
+
#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-#include "userns_helper.h"
-#include "test.h"
+#include "common.h"
+#include "tst_test.h"
#define CHILD1UID 0
#define CHILD1GID 0
@@ -57,16 +46,16 @@
#define UID_MAP 0
#define GID_MAP 1
-char *TCID = "user_namespace3";
-int TST_TOTAL = 1;
-static int cpid1, parentuid, parentgid;
+static int cpid1;
+static int parentuid;
+static int parentgid;
/*
* child_fn1() - Inside a new user namespace
*/
static int child_fn1(void)
{
- TST_SAFE_CHECKPOINT_WAIT(NULL, 0);
+ TST_CHECKPOINT_WAIT(0);
return 0;
}
@@ -75,161 +64,148 @@ static int child_fn1(void)
*/
static int child_fn2(void)
{
- int exit_val = 0;
int uid, gid;
char cpid1uidpath[BUFSIZ];
char cpid1gidpath[BUFSIZ];
int idinsidens, idoutsidens, length;
- TST_SAFE_CHECKPOINT_WAIT(NULL, 1);
+ TST_CHECKPOINT_WAIT(1);
uid = geteuid();
gid = getegid();
- if (uid != CHILD2UID || gid != CHILD2GID) {
- printf("unexpected uid=%d gid=%d\n", uid, gid);
- exit_val = 1;
- }
+ if (uid != CHILD2UID || gid != CHILD2GID)
+ tst_res(TFAIL, "unexpected uid=%d gid=%d", uid, gid);
+ else
+ tst_res(TPASS, "expected uid and gid");
- /*Get the uid parameters of the child_fn2 process.*/
- SAFE_FILE_SCANF(NULL, "/proc/self/uid_map", "%d %d %d", &idinsidens,
- &idoutsidens, &length);
+ /* Get the uid parameters of the child_fn2 process */
+ SAFE_FILE_SCANF("/proc/self/uid_map", "%d %d %d", &idinsidens, &idoutsidens, &length);
/* map file format:ID-inside-ns ID-outside-ns length
- If the process opening the file is in the same user namespace as
- the process PID, then ID-outside-ns is defined with respect to the
- parent user namespace.*/
+ * If the process opening the file is in the same user namespace as
+ * the process PID, then ID-outside-ns is defined with respect to the
+ * parent user namespace
+ */
if (idinsidens != CHILD2UID || idoutsidens != parentuid) {
- printf("child_fn2 checks /proc/cpid2/uid_map:\n");
- printf("unexpected: idinsidens=%d idoutsidens=%d\n",
- idinsidens, idoutsidens);
- exit_val = 1;
+ tst_res(TINFO, "child2 checks /proc/cpid2/uid_map");
+ tst_res(TFAIL, "unexpected: namespace ID inside=%d outside=%d", idinsidens, idoutsidens);
+ } else {
+ tst_res(TPASS, "expected namespaces IDs");
}
sprintf(cpid1uidpath, "/proc/%d/uid_map", cpid1);
- SAFE_FILE_SCANF(NULL, cpid1uidpath, "%d %d %d", &idinsidens,
- &idoutsidens, &length);
+ SAFE_FILE_SCANF(cpid1uidpath, "%d %d %d", &idinsidens, &idoutsidens, &length);
/* If the process opening the file is in a different user namespace,
- then ID-outside-ns is defined with respect to the user namespace
- of the process opening the file.*/
+ * then ID-outside-ns is defined with respect to the user namespace
+ * of the process opening the file
+ */
if (idinsidens != CHILD1UID || idoutsidens != CHILD2UID) {
- printf("child_fn2 checks /proc/cpid1/uid_map:\n");
- printf("unexpected: idinsidens=%d idoutsidens=%d\n",
- idinsidens, idoutsidens);
- exit_val = 1;
+ tst_res(TINFO, "child2 checks /proc/cpid1/uid_map");
+ tst_res(TFAIL, "unexpected: namespace ID inside=%d outside=%d", idinsidens, idoutsidens);
+ } else {
+ tst_res(TPASS, "expected namespaces IDs");
}
sprintf(cpid1gidpath, "/proc/%d/gid_map", cpid1);
- SAFE_FILE_SCANF(NULL, "/proc/self/gid_map", "%d %d %d",
- &idinsidens, &idoutsidens, &length);
+ SAFE_FILE_SCANF("/proc/self/gid_map", "%d %d %d", &idinsidens, &idoutsidens, &length);
if (idinsidens != CHILD2GID || idoutsidens != parentgid) {
- printf("child_fn2 checks /proc/cpid2/gid_map:\n");
- printf("unexpected: idinsidens=%d idoutsidens=%d\n",
- idinsidens, idoutsidens);
- exit_val = 1;
+ tst_res(TINFO, "child2 checks /proc/cpid2/gid_map");
+ tst_res(TFAIL, "unexpected: namespace ID inside=%d outside=%d", idinsidens, idoutsidens);
+ } else {
+ tst_res(TPASS, "expected namespaces IDs");
}
- SAFE_FILE_SCANF(NULL, cpid1gidpath, "%d %d %d", &idinsidens,
- &idoutsidens, &length);
+ SAFE_FILE_SCANF(cpid1gidpath, "%d %d %d", &idinsidens, &idoutsidens, &length);
if (idinsidens != CHILD1GID || idoutsidens != CHILD2GID) {
- printf("child_fn1 checks /proc/cpid1/gid_map:\n");
- printf("unexpected: idinsidens=%d idoutsidens=%d\n",
- idinsidens, idoutsidens);
- exit_val = 1;
+ tst_res(TINFO, "child1 checks /proc/cpid1/gid_map");
+ tst_res(TFAIL, "unexpected: namespace ID inside=%d outside=%d", idinsidens, idoutsidens);
+ } else {
+ tst_res(TPASS, "expected namespaces IDs");
}
- TST_SAFE_CHECKPOINT_WAKE(NULL, 0);
- TST_SAFE_CHECKPOINT_WAKE(NULL, 1);
- return exit_val;
-}
+ TST_CHECKPOINT_WAKE(0);
+ TST_CHECKPOINT_WAKE(1);
-static void cleanup(void)
-{
- tst_rmdir();
+ return 0;
}
static void setup(void)
{
check_newuser();
- tst_tmpdir();
- TST_CHECKPOINT_INIT(NULL);
}
-int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+static void run(void)
{
pid_t cpid2;
char path[BUFSIZ];
- int lc;
int fd;
int ret;
- tst_parse_opts(argc, argv, NULL, NULL);
- setup();
-
- for (lc = 0; TEST_LOOPING(lc); lc++) {
- tst_count = 0;
-
- parentuid = geteuid();
- parentgid = getegid();
-
- cpid1 = ltp_clone_quick(CLONE_NEWUSER | SIGCHLD,
- (void *)child_fn1, NULL);
- if (cpid1 < 0)
- tst_brkm(TBROK | TERRNO, cleanup,
- "cpid1 clone failed");
-
- cpid2 = ltp_clone_quick(CLONE_NEWUSER | SIGCHLD,
- (void *)child_fn2, NULL);
- if (cpid2 < 0)
- tst_brkm(TBROK | TERRNO, cleanup,
- "cpid2 clone failed");
-
- if (access("/proc/self/setgroups", F_OK) == 0) {
- sprintf(path, "/proc/%d/setgroups", cpid1);
- fd = SAFE_OPEN(cleanup, path, O_WRONLY, 0644);
- SAFE_WRITE(cleanup, 1, fd, "deny", 4);
- SAFE_CLOSE(cleanup, fd);
- /* If the setgroups file has the value "deny",
- * then the setgroups(2) system call can't
- * subsequently be reenabled (by writing "allow" to
- * the file) in this user namespace. (Attempts to
- * do so will fail with the error EPERM.)
- */
-
- /* test that setgroups can't be re-enabled */
- fd = SAFE_OPEN(cleanup, path, O_WRONLY, 0644);
- ret = write(fd, "allow", 5);
-
- if (ret != -1) {
- tst_brkm(TBROK | TERRNO, cleanup,
- "write action should fail");
- } else if (errno != EPERM) {
- tst_brkm(TBROK | TERRNO, cleanup,
- "unexpected error: \n");
- }
- SAFE_CLOSE(cleanup, fd);
- tst_resm(TPASS, "setgroups can't be re-enabled");
-
- sprintf(path, "/proc/%d/setgroups", cpid2);
- fd = SAFE_OPEN(cleanup, path, O_WRONLY, 0644);
- SAFE_WRITE(cleanup, 1, fd, "deny", 4);
- SAFE_CLOSE(cleanup, fd);
- }
-
- updatemap(cpid1, UID_MAP, CHILD1UID, parentuid, cleanup);
- updatemap(cpid2, UID_MAP, CHILD2UID, parentuid, cleanup);
-
- updatemap(cpid1, GID_MAP, CHILD1GID, parentgid, cleanup);
- updatemap(cpid2, GID_MAP, CHILD2GID, parentgid, cleanup);
-
- TST_SAFE_CHECKPOINT_WAKE_AND_WAIT(cleanup, 1);
-
- tst_record_childstatus(cleanup, cpid1);
- tst_record_childstatus(cleanup, cpid2);
+ parentuid = geteuid();
+ parentgid = getegid();
+
+ cpid1 = ltp_clone_quick(CLONE_NEWUSER | SIGCHLD, (void *)child_fn1, NULL);
+ if (cpid1 < 0)
+ tst_brk(TBROK | TTERRNO, "cpid1 clone failed");
+
+ cpid2 = ltp_clone_quick(CLONE_NEWUSER | SIGCHLD, (void *)child_fn2, NULL);
+ if (cpid2 < 0)
+ tst_brk(TBROK | TTERRNO, "cpid2 clone failed");
+
+ if (access("/proc/self/setgroups", F_OK) == 0) {
+ sprintf(path, "/proc/%d/setgroups", cpid1);
+
+ fd = SAFE_OPEN(path, O_WRONLY, 0644);
+ SAFE_WRITE(1, fd, "deny", 4);
+ SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
+
+ /* If the setgroups file has the value "deny",
+ * then the setgroups(2) system call can't
+ * subsequently be reenabled (by writing "allow" to
+ * the file) in this user namespace. (Attempts to
+ * do so will fail with the error EPERM.)
+ */
+
+ /* test that setgroups can't be re-enabled */
+ fd = SAFE_OPEN(path, O_WRONLY, 0644);
+ ret = write(fd, "allow", 5);
+
+ if (ret >= 0)
+ tst_brk(TBROK, "write action should fail");
+ else if (errno != EPERM)
+ tst_brk(TBROK | TTERRNO, "unexpected error");
+
+ SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
+
+ tst_res(TPASS, "setgroups can't be re-enabled");
+
+ sprintf(path, "/proc/%d/setgroups", cpid2);
+
+ fd = SAFE_OPEN(path, O_WRONLY, 0644);
+ SAFE_WRITE(1, fd, "deny", 4);
+ SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
}
- cleanup();
- tst_exit();
+
+ updatemap(cpid1, UID_MAP, CHILD1UID, parentuid);
+ updatemap(cpid2, UID_MAP, CHILD2UID, parentuid);
+
+ updatemap(cpid1, GID_MAP, CHILD1GID, parentgid);
+ updatemap(cpid2, GID_MAP, CHILD2GID, parentgid);
+
+ TST_CHECKPOINT_WAKE_AND_WAIT(1);
}
+
+static struct tst_test test = {
+ .setup = setup,
+ .test_all = run,
+ .needs_root = 1,
+ .needs_checkpoints = 1,
+ .needs_kconfigs = (const char *[]) {
+ "CONFIG_USER_NS",
+ NULL,
+ },
+};
--
2.35.1
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