[LTP] [PATCH v8 2/2] open16: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files
Wei Gao
wegao@suse.com
Thu Apr 16 02:55:23 CEST 2026
This commit adds test cases to verify the security restrictions for opening
FIFOs and regular files in world-writable sticky directories.
Signed-off-by: Wei Gao <wegao@suse.com>
---
runtest/syscalls | 1 +
testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore | 1 +
testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c | 128 ++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 130 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c
diff --git a/runtest/syscalls b/runtest/syscalls
index d72fceb5e..c14ebb3a0 100644
--- a/runtest/syscalls
+++ b/runtest/syscalls
@@ -1005,6 +1005,7 @@ open12 open12
open13 open13
open14 open14
open15 open15
+open16 open16
openat01 openat01
openat02 openat02
diff --git a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore
index af5997572..d2cacc02e 100644
--- a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore
+++ b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore
@@ -13,3 +13,4 @@
/open13
/open14
/open15
+/open16
diff --git a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8ba2d9ec9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c
@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2026 Wei Gao <wegao@suse.com>
+ */
+
+/*\
+ * Verify restricted opening of FIFOs and regular files in sticky directories.
+ * This test covers the positive case where access is allowed when protection
+ * is disabled (level 0), and the negative cases where access is disallowed
+ * (EACCES) in world-writable (level 1) or group-writable (level 2) sticky
+ * directories when the file is not owned by the opener.
+ *
+ * This test requires root to modify /proc/sys/fs/protected_* sysctls and
+ * to manage file ownership and permissions in sticky directories.
+ */
+
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include "tst_test.h"
+#include "tst_safe_file_at.h"
+#include "tst_uid.h"
+
+#define DIR "ltp_tmp_check1"
+#define TEST_FILE "test_file_1"
+#define TEST_FIFO "test_fifo_1"
+#define PROTECTED_REGULAR "/proc/sys/fs/protected_regular"
+#define PROTECTED_FIFOS "/proc/sys/fs/protected_fifos"
+#define TEST_FIFO_PATH DIR "/" TEST_FIFO
+
+static int dir_fd = -1;
+static uid_t uid1, uid2;
+static gid_t gid1;
+
+static struct tcase {
+ char *level;
+ int exp_errno;
+} tcases[] = {
+ {"0", 0},
+ {"1", EACCES},
+ {"2", EACCES},
+};
+
+static void verify_open(unsigned int n)
+{
+ struct tcase *tc = &tcases[n];
+ pid_t pid;
+
+ SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_REGULAR, "%s", tc->level);
+ SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_FIFOS, "%s", tc->level);
+
+ if (n == 2) {
+ SAFE_CHOWN(DIR, -1, gid1);
+ SAFE_CHMOD(DIR, 0030 | S_ISVTX);
+ } else {
+ SAFE_CHOWN(DIR, 0, 0);
+ SAFE_CHMOD(DIR, 0777 | S_ISVTX);
+ }
+
+ pid = SAFE_FORK();
+ if (!pid) {
+ SAFE_SETGID(gid1);
+ SAFE_SETUID(uid2);
+
+ if (tc->exp_errno) {
+ TST_EXP_FAIL2(openat(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777),
+ tc->exp_errno, "openat %s (Level %s)", TEST_FILE, tc->level);
+ TST_EXP_FAIL2(open(TEST_FIFO_PATH, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777),
+ tc->exp_errno, "open %s (Level %s)", TEST_FIFO, tc->level);
+ } else {
+ int fd = TST_EXP_FD(openat(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_CREAT | O_RDWR, 0777));
+ if (TST_PASS)
+ SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
+
+ fd = TST_EXP_FD(open(TEST_FIFO_PATH, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777));
+ if (TST_PASS)
+ SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
+ }
+
+ exit(0);
+ }
+
+ SAFE_WAITPID(pid, NULL, 0);
+}
+
+static void setup(void)
+{
+ struct passwd *pw;
+
+ pw = SAFE_GETPWNAM("nobody");
+ uid1 = pw->pw_uid;
+ gid1 = pw->pw_gid;
+ uid2 = tst_get_free_uid(uid1);
+
+ umask(0);
+ SAFE_MKDIR(DIR, 0777 | S_ISVTX);
+ dir_fd = SAFE_OPEN(DIR, O_DIRECTORY);
+
+ int fd = SAFE_OPENAT(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_CREAT | O_RDWR, 0777);
+ SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
+ SAFE_MKFIFO(TEST_FIFO_PATH, 0777);
+ SAFE_CHOWN(TEST_FIFO_PATH, uid1, gid1);
+ SAFE_CHOWN(DIR "/" TEST_FILE, uid1, gid1);
+}
+
+static void cleanup(void)
+{
+ if (dir_fd != -1)
+ SAFE_CLOSE(dir_fd);
+}
+
+static struct tst_test test = {
+ .setup = setup,
+ .cleanup = cleanup,
+ .needs_root = 1,
+ .tcnt = ARRAY_SIZE(tcases),
+ .test = verify_open,
+ .needs_tmpdir = 1,
+ .forks_child = 1,
+ .save_restore = (const struct tst_path_val[]) {
+ {PROTECTED_REGULAR, NULL, TST_SR_TCONF},
+ {PROTECTED_FIFOS, NULL, TST_SR_TCONF},
+ {}
+ },
+ .tags = (const struct tst_tag[]) {
+ {"linux-git", "30aba6656f61"},
+ {}
+ }
+};
--
2.52.0
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