[LTP] cve: reproducer for cve-2026-64600

[linuxtestproject.agent@gmail.com]

Hi Andrea,

On 2026-07-24, Andrea Cervesato wrote:
> cve: reproducer for cve-2026-64600

> +static void cleanup(void)
> +{
> +	stop_pressure_threads();
> +
> +	if (barrier_initialized)
> +		SAFE_PTHREAD_BARRIER_DESTROY(&barrier);
> +
> +	if (target_dio_fd != -1)
> +		SAFE_CLOSE(target_dio_fd);
> +
> +	if (target_fd != -1)
> +		SAFE_CLOSE(target_fd);
> +
> +	if (clone_fd != -1)
> +		SAFE_CLOSE(clone_fd);
> +
> +	free(tbuf);
> +	free(wbuf);
> +	free(rbuf);
> +}

The header comment says "Root privilege is regained in cleanup() so
the library can unmount the loop device", but cleanup() never calls
SAFE_SETEUID(0)/SAFE_SETEGID(0). setup() drops to "nobody" via
drop_privileges() and nothing restores euid/egid afterwards.

Other tests that drop privileges the same way restore them in
cleanup(), e.g. chmod06.c, acct01.c, creat06.c all call
SAFE_SETEUID(0) there. Per capabilities(7), effective capabilities are
cleared once euid moves away from 0, so the process is still
unprivileged when cleanup() returns. The library's subsequent unmount
of the loop device would then fail with EPERM, leaving the mount and
loop device attached.

Is a SAFE_SETEUID(0) (and SAFE_SETEGID(0)) call missing at the start
of cleanup()?

Verdict - Needs revision

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